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WHAT DO DEFINITIONS REALLY TELL
US ABOUT MEA...~ING?
John Mark Mattox
Brigham Young University
1.

Introduction
On numerous occasions as an elementary school and junior high school student, I had an experience which I am sure we can all reflect upon as having
had. One of my fellow classmates would make a statement containing the word
"ain't." At that point, he would be cut short in his speech by another of
my classmates who would proclaim with the utmost certainty, tlain't ain't a
word!tI Perhaps he was trying to demonstrate his great linguistic prowess to
an obviously unlettered associate who would dare to use the word tlain't,tI
or perhaps he was simply pointing out the social impropriety of such a usage.
Whatever the case, the person who dared to utter t1 a in't" in the scholarly
setting of a junior high school would inevitably retort, "it's in the dictionary." This assertion would, of course, spark interest in an immediate
and full investigation of the subject. We would march to the dictionary to
obtain the mind and will of Noah Webster on the subject, each of us certain
that Webster would vindicate our respective positions. To the chagrin of
some and to the delight of others, we would locate the following entry:
ain't. lao are not. b. is not. c. am not. though disapproved
by many and more common in less educated speech, used orally in most
parts of It he U.S. by many cultivated speakers esp. in the phrase
ain't I.
That concluding disclaimer notwithstanding, one thing was now beyond dispute: "ain't" was in fact a word! As we read that entry in Webster's volume, it was as if we had heard the great Kin~ Solomon himself urge us, "let
us hear the conclusion of the whole matter;" for so it was • .
This simple experience deserves some thoughtful consideration. Isn't it
amazing how profoundly the dictionary affects the language of a community?
Granted, the lexicographer's intent is more to describe words and their
uses than it is to dictate to the masses what they can and cannot do with
words. Nevertheless, when we descend from the clouds of academia long
enough to plant our feet firmly on the ground, we come to realize that more
often than not, academia's findings constitute the marching orders for the
waiting world of laymen below. This is especially true of the dictionary.
After all, when one wants to know how to spell, pronounce, or use a word,
the dictionary is consulted. Moreover, in the vast majority of cases, one
believes whatever the dictionary says. Perhaps, then, we as professional
linguists should view it as our moral obligation to provide the members of
our language community with an objective and meaningful view of the language
we share. The purpose of the present study is to investigate some new avenues of approach to the highly practical problem of defining words.

II.

Word Definition in History
Interest in the definition of words is by no means a recent phenomenon. The
first known English monolingual glossary grew out of the desire of the sup-

porters
able to
William
entries

of the Reformation that even the most humble Englishman should be
understand the scriptures. In his 1530 edition of the Pentateuch,
Tyndale included "a table expounding certyne wordes." The following
are typical:

Boothe, an housse made of bowes.
Consecrate, to apoynte a thinge to holy uses.
Slyme was • • • a fattenesse that osed out of the erth lyke unto tarre/
And thou mayst call it cement/if thou wilt.

Vapor/ a dewymiste as the smoke of a sethynge pott.

3

The first purely English dictionary to be published as a separate work appeared in London in 1604. The most famous of the early English dictionaries,
however, was published by Samuel Johnson in 1755. It was a monumental work
for that age, containing some 43,500 entries and 118,000 illustrative quotations in two volumes. 4 Nevertheless, Johnson's Dictionary came under criticism because of the obviously subjective character of some of his definitions.
For example, Johnson defines "oats" as "a grain, which in England is generally
given to horses, but in Scotland supports the people. "5 Moreover, botanist
and layman alike would encounter difficulty in identifying oats from Johnson's
taxonomic description: "It is of the grass leaved tribe; the flowers have no
petals, and are disposed in a loose panicle: the grain is eatable."
Noah Webster's famous American Dictionary of the English Language of 1828
more or less constituted the first recognition given by lexicography that
British English and American English were different to the extent that American English required a separate dictionary. As a natural consequence of this
recognition, Webster endeavored to describe words in a way that would be
most meaningful to Americans.
"The supreme completed achievement in all lexicography," however, is The
Oxford English Dictionary. The efforts which culminated in its publication
were begun in 1857 and completed in 1928. 6 Anyone familiar with The Oxford
English Dictionary knows that it is not at all unusual for a single entry to
continue for several pages and to list scores of contextual environments in
which the entry word has attested usage. This, on a smaller scale, of course,
is the pattern for all dictionaries. Those things which we commonly refer
to as definitions are, more often than not, simply statements of contextual
environments in which the word is known to be used; and, since the time of
Tyndale, the number of contexts typically listed for each word has significantly increased. This easily demonstrable fact constitutes the focal point
of our present concern. The dictionary itself suggests that a "definition"
as found in the contextual environment of a dictionary is "a statement of
the meaning of a word."? Is it possible that, in the vast majority of cases
in modern dictionaries, we are simply stating the contexts in which a word
may be used, or in which its referent appears, without really isolating the
meaning of the word itself? Perhaps an example would be helpful at this
point. One might say that a "hot dog" is a foodstuff which appears in the
contextual environment of fast food restaurants, airports, bus stations,
shopping malls, and carnival concession stands, as well as family picnics.
This observation would be true, and it would be part of the meaning of "hot
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dog." Nevertheless, when we hear the mention of the word "hot dog," we
all see in our minds' eye a picture of a hot dog that is not constrained
to any particular context, but which is still adequate to allow us to identify a hot dog whenever we see one in the referential world.
II.

A Possible Solution
It may be argued that meaning is simply the sum total of the contextual environments in which a linguistic form appears. If that is so, then why not
include in our dictionary entries a single statement which summarizes that
sum total of meaning as delimited by the contexts in which the form is known
to appear?
Saussure, VanSchooneveld, Jakobson, and other stellar figures of linguistics
have suggested that all words can be expressed as the union of two properties: the signans, which is the mental construct of the word (and not the
word on paper or in the air), and the signatum, which is the mental construct of the thing specified by the word in the real world (and not the
meaning itself). This is called the Linguistic Sign.

SIG1\ANS

SIGNATUM

For example, let us consider the word "tree."
guistic sign thusly:

We could represent its lin-

"the signif ier :"
not the word itself, but the
mental construct which has its
realization as the word "tree."

------~~~
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"the signified:"
not a specific tree, but the
acontextual mental construct
which designates a tree and
separates it from other things
in the real world (thus distinguishing it from, for example,
ocean liners, tacos, and dishwashing liquid, etc.)

Because the signifier is linked inseparably and acontextually to the signified, it would seem reasonable to suggest that there exists a common
thread of meaning which binds the two components of the sign together.
This common thread of meaning is called, in the terminology of Roman
Jakobson, "the invariant." Concerning this invariant, let us consider
the following important observations.
1.

When one utters the word "tree," in or out of context, the mental
construct which the word represents is comprehended by all members
of the speech community. Hence, for all practical purposes, it
is fair to think of the word "tree" as the real world manifestation of the idea of "tree."

2.

When one points to any number of trees in the real world, each of
which is merely a specific contextual example of the abstract
notion "tree," all members of the speech conununity can still make
the connection between the plant form they see with their eyes
and the mental construct "tree" they comprehend in their minds.

3.

Therefore, it ought to be possible, in principle at least, to
state in words, in the form of an "invariant definition,lI the
essence which ties the word lI tree" with its referents in the
real world.

For our purposes, then, we will identify the various components of the
linguistic sign as follows:
the word itself (W)
the invariant definition (I)
.which can be applied to W in
any context

SIGNANS

the real
in a

SIGNATUM

~t'----

-- context

specif ied in the
W in a specific
context
another thing specified in the
real world by W in a specific
context (C )
3

As we have noted, modern dictionaries list as definitions multiple contextual environments in which a word is known to appear. Hence, each word is
represented as having several different definitions or, in other words, as
meaning several different things. The unavoidable consequence of this
atomization is, in the words of Roman Jakobson, that
the relation between sign and meaning is lost and questions of meaning
are wrongly eliminated from the theory of signs • • • Semantics, the
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very core of linguistics and of sign theory in general is thus deprived
of an object of inquiry, and we are left with such grotesque results
as morphology which never refers to the meanings of forms. 8
Therefore, in order to understand what a word really means, it seems desirable to set forth a general invariant definition which would apply to the
word in any given context, regardless of the syntactic category in which
the word might be used. Such an invariant definition would have the effect
of uniting all statements of the word's contextual usage under one definition which pervades all contexts: 9

G
G~--

Concerning the nature of the invariant, Linda Waugh, of Cornell University,
has observed the following:
[In order to] extract such an invariant, one must take a sufficiently
abstract view of the form in question--one cannot simply equate its
meaning with anyone usage nor with its interpretation in given contexts. The meaning • • • cannot contradict anyone contextual usage,
but neither can it be equated with anyone contextual usage. IO
IV.

The Central Problem
In keeping with the criteria stated above by Linda Waugh, invariant definitions have been written for a few words. The words have primarily been socalled "function words," such as prepositions. The process typically followed for formulating invariant definitions includes:
1.

Identifying as many contextual environments for the word as
possible, and

2.

formulating by logic, intuition, or plain guesswork a definition
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that seems to incorporate all of the contexts previously identified.
None need be surprised at the apparent sloppiness of this method, for it
is nothing more or less than the well-known scientific method that has been
used in all sciences since the days of the 13th century probabilists.
Hence, the methodology for identifying invariants is not an issue here.
Moreover, it is really not a problem to come up with a definition that is
sufficiently abstract so as to encompass all contexts. For example, we
could, in the extreme case, define the word "up" as "a function word that
shows a relationship between physical or abstract entities." That definition would certainly cover any and all conceivable contexts in which the
word "up" could appear. Unfortunately, it would also apply to "down,"
"inside," "beside," etc. Hence, there arises an important question at this
juncture: Is it, in fact, possible to write an invariant definition that
is sufficiently abstract so as to apply to any and all contexts in which a
word can appear, but that is sufficiently restricted so as to apply to that
word alone? Alternatively stated, what is the relationship between the sum
total of the meaning expressed by Wand the sum total of the meaning accounted for by I?
To illustrate this, we will represent the universe of linguistic meanings
expressible by language A as a geometric plane:

,
We will assume that every Wx of language A occupies a specific semantic
territory within the plane." By "semantic territory" we mean the exhaustive list of standard dictionary definitions that are applied to Wx '
Hence, we may say that the semantic territory intuitively defines the use
of Wx within the language. Some of these semantic territories will overlap with the semantic territories of other words with which they exist in
a hierarchical relationship:
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I

o
<::)

e

o
~o

e

~'CJ

With each semantic territoy there is an associated Ix which, by definition,
pervades at least the entire territory. In other words, Ix is one definition which covers all the standard dictionary definitions applicable to Wx •
Given the semantic territory Wx

........--~

and the semantic territory of meaning accounted for by Ix

Ix
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there could logically exist four different relationships between Wx and
Ix·
Possibility #1:

The territory of Wx and Ix could perfectly overlap.

In this case, Ix accounts for all the meaning of Wx and only for the meaning
of Wx •
Possibility #2:

Ix could be larger than Wx .

In this case, Ix is useful as a descriptor of the semantic meaning had in
common by all contexts in which Wx occurs; but it does not provide sufficient information to identify Wx as a unique semantic entity.
Possibility #3:

Wx could be larger than Ix.

~
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This is what most laymen would perceive to be the relationship between W
and I. In this case, there are some aspects of the meaning of Wx that are
not accounted for by Ix. This possibility, however, is disqualified by
virtue of the definition of invariance which, given acceptance of the definition, requires that Ix pervade at least the entire semantic field of Wx •
Possibility #4:

There is no intersection whatsoever between Wx and Ix'

This possibility is simply a special case of why we rejected Possibility
#3; and we reject Possibility #4 on the same grounds. Even a standard
dictionary, which associates specific meanings with specific words refutes
this possibility.
Our present concern, then, is to determine whether the nature of invariant
definitions, as they are presently written, are more correctly characterized
by Possibility #1 (in which Wx and Ix exactly correspond) or by Possibility
#2 (in which Ix is larger than Wx )'
V.

Methodology
In order to draw some conclusions as to which of the two competing possibilities more correctly reflects the nature of the invariant definition,
Dr. Alan K. Helby of Brigham Young University's Department of Linguistics,
together with the present author, developed a test which was administered
during January, 1984, to 113 college students enrolled in English 115,
College Reading and Writing (freshman composition). The students were
presented with a paper ll containing the prepositions "to" and "with."
With each of these prepositions was listed
1.

a proposed invariant definition,

2.

three examples of divergent contexts in which the preposition
could typically occur, and

3.

an explanation following each contextual example of how the invariant definition could be applied to that context.

Next, the students were confronted with the follOWing problem.
We have just applied both definitions to three very different contexts. Is is possible, however, that the definition we listed for
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"to" could just as easily be used as the definition for "with?"
On the other hand, is it possible that the definition we have
listed for "with" could just as easily be used as the definition for "to?" You be the judge.
On

the next page, the students were given the following instructions:
DO NOT GO BACK TO THE FIRST PAGE. (This instruction was included
in order to reduce the number of potential cases of mechanical
association of the definitions with the sentences.)
Below are two sentences containing "to" and two sentences containing
"with." At the bottom of the page are the two definitions you have
already seen. One definition is marked A and the other definition
is marked B.
Think about the meaning of the underlined "to" or "with" in each
sentence. If you think definition A best defines the underlined
word, write A in the blank beside the sentence. If you think definition B best defines the underlined word, write B in the blank
beside the sentence. However, if you think that either definition
A or B would define the underlined word equally well, write AB in
the blank beside the sentence.

The students were then presented with four sentences. The first and third
sentences contained the word "to" and the second and fourth sentences contained the word "with:"
1.

Jack and Jill both decided !£ get a pail of water.

2.

Mike is a man with a hot temper.

3.

The solution you propose is fine to me.

4.

Sue bought the house with the money she borrowed.

The definitions were listed as follows: 12
A

a word that relates two ideas such that one idea is viewed as
existing in a fitted, shaped relationship with the other idea

B

a word that relates two ideas such that both ideas are seen as
participants in the same verbal action

AB

either of the above definitions could be used to define the
underlined word equally well

The students were then given ten minutes in which to complete the task.
VI.

Results
We will summarize the results of the instrument sentence by sentence: 13
Sentence 111:

"Jack and Jill both decided to get a pail of water."
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This

was clearly a context in which "to" fit better than "with." Fifty-eight
per cent of those surveyed associated the proposed definition for "to"
with this sentence. Thirty per cent said that the definition for "with"
better described "to" in this sentence, while only twelve per cent believed
that both definitions applied equally well.
Sentence 112: "Mike is a man with a hot temper." This was clearly a context in which "with" fit better than "to." Nevertheless, the distinction
between the definitions was not so clear. Only forty-four per cent agreed
that definition B actually fit "with" the best, while forty-six per cent
felt that the definition intended for "to" better defined "with" in this
context. Ten percent said that either definition would work equally well.
Sentence 113: "The solution you propose is fine to me." Here, it must be
admitted that either "to" or "with" could have fit in this sentence. Of
course, the central issue here remains whether or not the definition for
"to" applies to the underlined word in the sentence. Nevertheless, it is
possible that the survey population was confused on this point; fifty per
cent of them said that either definition A or B would define the underlined
word equally well. Thirty-five per cent selected definition A and twentyone per cent selected definition B.
Sentence 114: "Sue bought the house with the money she borrowed." Here,
"with" clearly fits this sentence better than does "to," and the data supports this claim. Fifty-three per cent selected definition B while only
twenty-five per cent selected definition A. Twenty-two per cent said that
either definition would work equally well.
VII.

Discussion
An analysis was also done of the eighty-one possible combinations in which

the answers could have occurred. 14 Forty-one of these possible letter combinations appeared in the data. The four-letter combinations referred to below
are the answers given to sentences one through four respectively. AB will be
listed as C to alleviate confusion.
Of particular interest were the _answer sequences ABAB, ABCB, and BACA.

Nine individuals listed ABAB as their answer sequence. That means that only
eight per cent of those surveyed matched the prepositions with their definitions exactly as intended by the authors of the survey. However, nineteen
per cent listed the sequence ABCB, thus agreeing with the survey authors in
every case except sentence #3. Again, this can potentially be explained by
the fact that both "to" and "with" could have fit in that context. If we
discount sentence 113, then, twenty-seven per cent agreed with the authors
exactly as pertaining to sentences Ill, 112, and 114. This constitutes the
largest single group out of the 113 respondents. Along these lines, however,
we are confronted with a puzzling set of anSwer sequences: BAAA, BABA, and
BACA. Discounting sentence 113, thirteen per cent of the respondents completely disagreed with the authors in sentences Ill, 112, and 114. Hence, the
largest single group of respondents (27 per cent) were completely successful
in matching invariant definitions with their referents in cases where context
clearly did not overlap, while the second largest group of respondents (13
per cent) were totally unsuccessful in matching word and definition.
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The very fact that a plurality--although not a majority--of the respondents
were able to use invariant definitions to discriminate meaning suggests that
invariant definitions could potentially be refined to the point that a significant majority of the language community could use them to discriminate
meaning. Admittedly, this exists, for the present at least, as a mere theoretical possibility. It is possible that improved definitions or more
training time for their users could significantly improve the usefulness
of these definitions.
Heretofore, a serious attempt to define words in invariant terms has only
been made with function words (like prepositions) and some bound morphemes
(like -ly, -ed, and un-). The limited experimentation that has been done
in an attempt to define "content words" (such as nouns, verbs, and adjecttives) has proven the task to be a very difficult one.
There are other barriers which must be overcome. How, for example, will we
define abstractions such as "love," "hate," or "mercy," or ethical notions
such as "goodness," "justice," or "truth?" Philosophers, judicial officers,
and legislators, etc., daily struggle with the problem of defining these
notions, even in terms of specific contextual environments! The current
method used for isolating the invariant requires general agreement on what
the possible contextual environments are before work can even begin on
developing a definition. Moreover, how will we begin to define words that
have both scientific and lay contextual definitions (like "salt" or "atom")?
These problems are not by any means insurmountable (given the assumption
that words can indeed be defined at all); but they are problems which, as
our present experiment seems to indicate, will have to be addressed.'
Sentence #3 raises some very interesting questions. While it, in and
itself, does not prove that the semantic territory covered by Wx does
exactly correspond with the semantic territory covered by Ix, it does
troduce the possibility that two words Wx and Wj and their respective
variant definitions, Ix and I j could overlap in the following manner:

of
not
inin-

Such a model could account for the results obtained in sentence #3. Also,
this model would account for the appearance of synonomy in specific contextual environments, without requiring that two words Wx and Wj be considered
as synonyms themselves.
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VIII.

Conclusions and Recommendations
A millenium ago, men had to get the equivalent of a university education
in order to learn how to multiply and divide. Now, these arithmetic functions are taught in the early years of elementary school. Perhaps a century or so from now it will be commonplace to own a dictionary whose entries
contain:
1.

the word's spelling,

2.

its pronunciation,

3.

its invariant definition, and

4.

a representative list of contextual environments in which the word
is attested to have appeared.

The present author frankly admits that because of constraints resulting from
budgetary limitations. the size of populations available for sampling, and
the general state of present research involving the idea of invariance, this
study is a preliminary one at best. Nevertheless, we consider the present
data to be sufficiently interesting to warrant the continued investigation
of the questions introduced here; and indeed, we welcome the development of
experiments which would either confirm or refute these findings. Whatever
the case, one thing beyond question is the fact that any unified theory of
semantics will ultimately have to deal with the issue of invariance. When
that happens, linguistics will be required to take a position on the relationship between invariance and word definition. If, in that future day,
we can use the idea of invariance to increase the usefulness and comprehensibility of definitions. we will have made a great contribution toward improving the basic language tool that linguis~ and all literate members of
the speech community have in common: the dictionary.
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NOTES
1Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language,
1981 ed., s. v. "ain't."
2Ecclesiastes 12:13.
3EnCyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. "aictionary," by Allen
Walker Read.
4 Ibid •
5Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, 2 vols. (London:
W. Strahan, MDCCLV; reprint ed., New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1967), s.v.
"oats."
6Encyc1opaedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. "dictionary," by Allen Walker
Read.
7Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language,
1981, ed., s.v. "definition."
8Roman Jakobson, "Beitrag zur a11egemeinen Kasuslehre," Trans. by
Kenneth L. Miner. (Published in German in Travaux de Cercle Linguistique
de Prague VI, 1936), p. 2 of the English translation.
9This statement on invariant definitions involves an important assumption concerning the idea of synonymy. We will define a "synonym" as any
word Wj that could replace Wx in any and all contexts in which Wx could appear, without affecting the meaning of the syntagmatic string which composes
the contextual environment of Wx . Therefore, Wj is a synonym of Wx if and
only if Wj can be used completely interchangeably with Wx in any and all
contexts. We will state, by definition, that Wx has no synonyms.
lOLinda R. Waugh, "Lexical Meaning: the prepositions en and dans in
French," Lingua (June, 1976) vol. 39, p. 71.
1lSee Appendix 1 for a copy of the survey instrument, along with a copy
of the instructions given to those BYU faculty members who administered the
instrument.
12It is not our purpose here to provide a lengthy defense for the
correctness of the proposed invariant definitions. The definition for "to"
is presented and defended by the present author in a treatise entitled, "The
Meaning of 'TO'," published in Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Symposium
of the Deseret Language and Linguistics Societ~, 1982.
The definition for "with" is the result of research by Dr. John S. Robertson
of the Department of Linguistics, Brigham Young University. For the purposes
of the present study, we will accept these definitions as "given" and as
representative of the current state of research in the area of invariant
definitions.
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l3 See Appendix 2 for a tabulation of the survey results.
l4See Appendix 3 for a tabulation of these data.
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APPENDIX 1

The following is a copy of the survey instrument given to 113 students
enrolled in English 115, College Reading and Writing (freshman composition)
in January, 1984.
The first page is a copy of the instructions given to the English Department
faculty members selected to administer the survey to their students. The
next two pages are copies of the survey instrument itself.
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PLEASE READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE STUDENTS PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY:

PLEASE READ ALL INSTRUCTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS VERY CAREFULLY AND ANSWER THE
FOUR QUESTIONS ON THE SECOND PAGE.

PLEASE BE SURE TO ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS.

YOU HAVE TEN MINUTES IN WHICH TO COMPLETE THIS EXERCISE.
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Have you ever tried to define a preposition?
along with their definitions.

Below are two prepositions,

TO - relates two ideas such that one of the ideas is seen as existing in
a fitted, shaped relationship with the other idea.

FOR EXAMPLE:
"John rode to the city." (John's riding is adapted, fitted in such
a way that he will, if he continues on the present course, arrive at
the city.)
"Sue's speech was .!£ the point." (Sue adapted her speech so that the
object of her speaking was clear and unmistakable.)
"Bob eats to live." (Bob's eating habits are adapted, fitted so that
his eating is sufficient only to keep him alive.)
WITH - relates two ideas such that both ideas are seen as participants in
the same verbal action.

FOR EXAMPLE
"John fought bitterly with his partner." (John and his partner participated in fighting which involved both of them at the same time.)
"Sue ran with only the greatest of effort." (Sue's running involved,
at the same time, a degree of effort without which she could not run.)
"Bob left money with his mother." (Bob's leaving occurred in such a
way that his money and his mother were participants in his leaving
at the same time and to the same c:tent.)

We have just applied both definitions to three very different contexts.
Is it possible, however, that the definition we have listed for "to" could
just as easily be used as the definition for "with?" On the other hand,
is it possible that the definition we have listed for "with" could just
as easily be used as the definition for "to?" You be the judge:
TUP~

TO THE NEXT PAGE
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DO NOT GO BACK TO THE FIRST PAGE.
Below are two sentences containing "to" and two sentences containing "with."
At the bottom of the page are the two definitions you have already seen.
One definition is marked A and the other definition is marked B.
Think about the meaning of the underlined word in each sentence. If you
think definition A best defines the underlined word, write A in the blank
beside the sentence. If you think definition B best defines the underlined
word, write B in the blank beside the sentence. However, if you think that
either definition A or B would define the underlined word equally well,
write AB in the blank beside the sentence.
Jack and Jill both decided to get a pail of water.
Mike is a man with a hot temper.
The solution you propose is fine to me.
Sue bought the house with the money she borrowed.

A

a word that relates two ideas such that one idea is viewed
as existing in a fitted, shaped relationship with the other
idea

B

a word that relates two ideas such that both ideas are seen
as participants in the same verbal action

AB

either of the above definitions could be used to define the
underlined word equally well

TlliL~K

YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION
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APPENDIX 2
The following table summarizes the raw data obtained from
the survey.
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DEFINITIONS
113 RESPONDENTS

SENTENCES

1-

Jack and Jill both decided
pail of water.

2.

Mike is a man with a hot temper.

~

get a

A

B

C

65 (58%)

34 (30%)

14 (12%)

52 (46%)

50 (44%)

11 (10%)
1.0
,......
.--t

3.

The solu t ion you propose is f ine

4.

Sue bought the house with the money
she borrowed.

~

me.

35 (31%)

21 (19%)

57 (50%)

28 (25%)

60 (53%)

25 (22%)

A

a word that relates two ideas such that one idea is viewed as existing in a fitted, shaped
relationship with the other idea

B

a word that relates two ideas such that both ideas are seen as participants in the same verbal
action

C

either of the above definitions could be used to define the underlined word equally well.

APPENDIX 3

The following table lists the eighty-one possible letter combinations
which could have occurred as answers on the survey instruments. Beside
each four-letter combination is listed the number of times in which a
respondent selected that letter combination as an answer sequence for
matching sentence and definition.
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Possible
Answer
Combinations

Number of
students responding
with answer combination

MAA

1

MAE

2

MAC

1

MBA

2

MBB

1

MBC

1

MCA

2

MCB

3

MCC

0

ABAA

1

ABAB

9

ABAC

4

ABBA

3

ABBB

0

ABBC

1

ABCA

4

ABCB

22

ABCC

3

ACM

0

ACAB

1

ACAC

1

ACBA

0

ACBB

0

ACBC

0

ACCA

0

ACCB

3
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Possible
Answer
Combinations

Number of
students responding
with answer combination

ACCC

0

BAAA

3

BAAB

3

BMC

5

BABA

1

BABB

3

BABC

1

BACA

11

BACB

3

BACC

2

BBM

0

BBAB

0

BBAC

0

BBBA

0

BBBB

0

BBBC

0

BBCA

0

BBCB

0

BBCC

0

BCM

0

BCAB

0

BCAC

0

BCBA

0

BCBB

0

BCBC

1

BCCA

0

BCCB

0
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Number of
students responding
with answer combination

Possible
Answer
Combinations
BCCC

1

CAM

0

CAAB

1

CAAC

1

CABA

0

CABB

2

CABC

1

CABA

0

CABB

1

CABC

0

CBAA

0

CBAB

3

CBAC

0

CBBA

0

CBBB

0

CBBC

0

CBCA

0

CBCB

1

CBCC

0

CCAA

0

CCAB

0

CCAC

0

CCBA

0

CCBB

1

CCBC

1

CCCA

0

CCCB

1

CCCC
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